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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
MARION CATHERINE HOWES, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 950133-CA 
Priority 10 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY KNOWN AS THE 
STEVENSON HOUSE WAS OWNED BY DECEDENT AND C. LEO HOWES AS JOINT 
TENANTS AS OF THE TIME OF DECEDENT'S DEATH AND OWNERSHIP OF THE 
STEVENSON HOUSE DEVOLVED ON C. LEO HOWES BY OPERATION OF LAW. 
A. 
There Are No Stipulations Of The Parties As To Any Deed. 
Appellee Howes' Brief states at page 8 as follows: 
As was stipulated by the parties and decided by a prior court, the 
title to the home was held by Defendant (Howes) and his wife 
(Decedent) as joint tenants at the time of her death. (R. 76, 941, 
1499, 1522) Asserting the stipulation of the parties for the record, 
Defendant's counsel states without objection as follows: 
As far as the joint tenancy, the title of the deed 
[Quit Claim Deed dated March 10, 1989] as 
stipulated by counsel, was in joint tenancy at her 
death. Nothing evidences the intent of the decedent 
more than the deed. The deed is not ambiguous on 
its face. The deed is clear and it evidences her 
intent to transfer that property to her husband upon 
her death. 
The quotation cited by Howes' attorney, Mr. Shapiro, as being the unobjected to 
stipulation is from Mr. Shapiro's opening statement telling the judge what he was going to prove 
during the course of trial. (R. 941) The opening argument statement itself refers to "as 
stipulated by counsel" which stipulation is not in the record nor was there ever any stipulation 
to this effect. And even this purported stipulation has to be supplemented by Mr. Shapiro by 
inserting in brackets "Quit Claim Deed dated March 10, 1989." 
(R. 1499) cited by Howes as being a stipulation relating to the purported deed 
contains a reference to an unidentified deed during the cross-examination of Howes. 
(R. 1522) cited by Howes as being a stipulation is a reference to an unidentified 
deed in the closing argument by Mr. Bybee, attorney for Greg Griffiths, who did not represent 
Appellant Poulsen in the trial court. 
B. 
Prior Court Proceeding. 
(R. 76) cited by Howes as a decision by a prior court that title to the subject 
property was held by Howes and Decedent as joint tenants is a reference to Civil No. 930900838 
where Appellant Poulsen and Gregory Griffiths as Plaintiffs, Pro Se, brought an action against 
Howes for Injunctive Relief. 
An initial Order to Show Cause hearing of approximately 10 minutes duration was 
held on April 2, 1993 on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Answer and for a Restraining Order or 
Preliminary Injunction at the close of which the matter was to be dismissed by Plaintiffs pursuant 
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to Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that Mr. Shapiro was to prepare the Order. 
(Docket of this case is available on Court Exchange.) 
Notwithstanding the direction of the Court, Howes' attorney prepared detailed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order which appears in the Record on Appeal at 
(R. 72-78). It should be noted that the Order, (R. 72, 73) does not make an order concerning 
the state of the title of the subject property. 
There are several problems with Howes reliance on this proceeding as evidence 
"that the title to home was held by Defendant (Howes) and his wife (Decedent) as joint tenants 
at the time of her death.w 
1. There was no final judgment on the merits as required by Mackintosh v 
Hampshire. 832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. The issue in this proceeding was not completely, fully and fairly litigated. 
Mackintosh, supra. 
3. Howes failed to assert collateral estoppel, issue preclusion or obtain 
judicial notice of this proceeding at the time of the trial of the matter when the issue of the deed 
had in fact been raised by Howes. 
C. 
Colloquies Between Court and Counsel. 
Because of the legally insufficient evidence to support Findings of Fact 9,10 and 
38, Howes relies on the colloquy between Court and Counsel at (R. 1082-1085) also cited by 
Appellant in her Brief at page 9, where there is a reference to an unidentified joint tenancy deed. 
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It should be further noted that Mr. Shapiro has supplemented his "testimony" at 
(R. 1084) by bracketed insertions and a footnote to clarify the thoughts of the parties at the time 
of the colloquy. 
The colloquy at (R. 1431) fails to identify any specific deed. 
D. 
Testimony. 
Howes cites the testimony of Howes being cross examined by Griffiths attorney 
Mr. Bybee, at (R. 1499). There is no reference to any specific deed in the testimony but Mr. 
Shapiro again inserts the identification of the deed in brackets to cover his own error. 
E. 
Poulsen's Closing Argument. 
Howes cites the closing argument of Poulsen at (R. 1518, 1519) as evidence to 
support Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 38 even though the argument does not refer to a specific 
deed. 
F. 
Griffiths' Attorney's Closing Arguments. 
Howes cites Griffith's attorney's closing arguments as evidence to support 
Findings of Fact 9, 10 and 38 even though the argument, as before, does not refer to a specific 
deed. 
G. 
Affidavit of Gregory Griffiths. 
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The affidavit of Griffiths, Trial Exhibit 82, was introduced by Mr. Shapiro for 
the sole purpose of impeaching Griffiths' testimony that the Wedding Reception Center known 
as Stevenson House was a partnership between he and Decedent when his affidavit stated it was 
Decedent's sole proprietorship. (R. 1333) There is a reference to a deed in the affidavit, but 
the deed is unidentified. The affidavit was not presented, introduced or argued to the trial court 
as evidence of the state of title to the subject property at the time of Decedent's death and was 
received in evidence for the limited purpose of impeaching Griffiths. 
H. 
Trial Issues as to the Deed. 
The sequence of filings related to the issue of the purported Quit Claim Deed of 
March 10, 1989 are detailed in Appellant's Brief at pages 10 and 11. The issue of this deed was 
raised by Howes and it was he who had the burden of proof as to the deed and all of the aspects 
of its validity including the existence of at least two unities of title that are still currently 
required. It is conceded that the burden was on Poulsen and Griffiths to prove severance once 
the joint tenancy deed had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 
I. 
Preserving Issues on Appeal. 
Poulsen agrees that there are no citations to the record preserving the issue of the 
purported Quit Claim Deed of March 10, 1989 for appeal as there is no evidence or a portion 
of the trial record identifiable where the purported deed was proved and thus, impossible to cite 
to the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
The purported Quit Claim Deed dated March 10, 1989 was not properly 
authenticated and introduced into evidence at the time of trial, nor was there any evidence as to 
its due execution, delivery, recording, consideration therefor, the intent of Decedent and the 
parties or acceptance. Further the evidence showed that the untities of interest and possession 
were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Relief should be granted as requested 
in the Conclusion to Appellant's Brief, page 15. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Abies 
Attorney for Appellant Lynn Poulsen 
Lynn Poulsen, Pro Se 
Appellant 
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